This paper studies wage dispersion among identical workers in a random matching search model where workers gradually lose human capital during unemployment. Unemployed workers accept lower wages to avoid long unemployment spells, so wage dispersion increases among identical workers. Using estimates from micro data, I show that the increase is an important improvement over baseline search models. When workers can also search on the job, the model accounts for all of the observed residual wage dispersion.
Introduction
A large number of papers in labor economics explore the determinants of wages. The effects on wages of worker characteristics, such as education or tenure, are well documented. However, worker characteristics can only explain a fraction of the observed wage dispersion in the data. Once one controls for these characteristics, the residual still displays a large amount of dispersion. Therefore, observationally similar workers are paid different wages.
Search models of the labor market can explain why apparently similar workers are paid different wages. In these models, workers adopt a reservation wage strategy when looking for jobs. Job offers are only available with a given frequency, so workers accept a job offer if the associated wage is above their reservation value. This acceptance rule by workers generates wage dispersion, even among identical workers.
1 However, recent work by Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) shows that baseline search models fail to generate significant wage dispersion.
The authors use the ratio between the mean and minimum wage observation, the mean-min ratio or M m ratio, to measure wage dispersion. In search models the M m ratio is a function of labor-market flows and preference parameters, for which reliable estimates exist. These estimates imply an M m ratio in search models of around 1.05, implying that the mean wage is 5% higher than the minimum observed wage. By contrast, the residual in a Mincerian regression, with as many controls as possible, gives a 50-10 percentile ratio between 1.7 and 1.9. Given that this 50-10 percentile ratio is a reasonable empirical counterpart to the M m ratio, the gap between the two values is remarkable.
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This paper introduces a search model in which workers lose some human capital or skills during unemployment. Workers become less productive while they remain unemployed, so wages depend on workers' unemployment histories -their cumulative time spent in unemployment.
I use this model to address the following question: What happens to wage dispersion among identical workers if they lose human capital during unemployment? Because the wage loss associated with unemployment affects workers' search behavior, the model generates further wage dispersion compared to baseline search models. The intuition is the following. Unemployment "hurts" workers. They lose human capital during unemployment, which depreciates their wages. Since longer unemployment spells lead to larger wage losses, workers are willing to lower their reservation wage and accept lower wages to leave unemployment. With a lower reservation wage, wage dispersion increases among identical workers.
The literature uses the term frictional wage dispersion to describe the wage dispersion among identical workers that arises from search frictions. For example, see Mortensen (2005) and Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) .
2 Using the 10th percentile reduces some of the measurement error associated with the minimum observation.
3 To avoid repetition I use wage dispersion to refer to wage dispersion among ex-ante identical workers, the focus of the paper.
ing way. Workers' human capital depreciates at a constant rate while they stay in unemploy-
ment.
7 This feature is introduced in an otherwise typical search model, the Pissarides (1985) random matching model. Each match between the firm and the worker has a match-specific productivity. In contrast to the standard model, the productivity of the match further depends on the worker's human capital, which is uniquely determined by workers' unemployment history. When the worker and the firm meet, if the match-specific productivity is above a reservation productivity value they start to produce.
I assume that unemployment benefits are proportional to workers' human capital. As a result, benefits gradually decrease while workers stay unemployed. There is no reason to believe that benefits should satisfy this property, but assuming it greatly simplifies the solution. However, in the paper I also solve the model with constant unemployment benefits, using numerical methods, and show that it generates very similar amounts of wage dispersion. With proportional benefits, a closed form solution exists. The M m ratio is independent of any distributional assumption for match productivities. Evaluating the M m ratio only requires knowledge of a few parameters, namely the labor market flow rates, the depreciation rate of human capital during unemployment, the interest rate, and the relative size of average wages and unemployment benefits -the replacement ratio.
The paper contains some empirical work to quantify the amount of wage dispersion consistent with the data. To evaluate the M m ratio in the model, I estimate the rate at which workers lose human capital during unemployment, and the labor market flows, i.e. the job finding and separation rates. I use the PSID, one of the large panels of US workers. First, I
use the panel structure to construct workers' unemployment history. To estimate the human capital depreciation rate during unemployment, I regress log wages on unemployment history and other worker covariates in standard Mincerian regressions. The regressions indicate that an additional month of unemployment history is associated with around 1.2% wage loss. I then estimate the job finding and separation rates for the PSID. These estimates give the value of the M m ratio consistent with the PSID. Finally, the M m ratio in the model is compared to the 50-10 percentile ratio of the residual in the Mincerian regression for the PSID.
Related literature. This paper is motivated by the findings in Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) that baseline search models fail to generate significant wage dispersion. The paper is also related to two literatures.
First, a large empirical literature explores the effects of job displacement on workers' earnings. Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998) are excellent reviews of the job displacement literature.
The literature finds that job displacement causes large and very persistent earning losses to displaced workers. 10 The magnitude of the earnings losses are much larger than those of this paper. The difference in their estimates comes from their focus on displaced workers, a smaller set of unemployed workers who usually suffer larger losses. 11 Using the estimates from the job displacement literature would only increase wage dispersion, so this difference is not problematic. However, the empirical work in this paper is better suited for the model for two reasons.
First, only some unemployed workers are displaced. Second, because my empirical work focuses on how the wage loss depends on workers' unemployment history, it provides a better mapping between the empirical estimates and the corresponding variable in the model.
The second literature introduces the loss of skills or human capital during unemployment into search models. Aside from modeling differences, these papers answer different questions.
In Ljungqvist & Sargent (1998) workers lose human capital when they are unemployed, and accumulate it when employed. Their model offers an explanation for the high unemployment in Europe compared to the US. 12 Pissarides (1992) constructs an overlapping generations model.
Workers also lose human capital during unemployment. He finds that unemployment becomes more persistent and studies the implications for long term unemployment. Shimer & Werning (2006) and Pavoni (2011) use the loss of human capital during unemployment to study unemployment insurance. The question in this paper is different. I implement the effects of unemployment history on wages to explore the capacity of search models to generate wage dispersion.
Two papers are more closely related. In Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela & Coles (2011) workers accumulate human capital when they are employed. They assume that employed workers can search on the job, and that employed and unemployed workers receive job offers at the same rate. As Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) demonstrate, this assumption of same job offer rates implies very large M m ratios, but unfortunately it is at odds with the data. Further, Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela & Coles (2011) calibrate the parameters taking the empirical M m ratio as a target. I proceed differently. The M m is not a target in a calibration exercise. The model shows a direct link between the parameters in the model and the dispersion of wages.
I estimate the parameters from the data, and use them to quantify the dispersion of wages 10 Although the size of the earnings losses varies depending on the data source and the period or location studied. Couch & Placzek (2010) , Jacobson, LaLonde & Sullivan (1993) , Schoeni & Dardia (2003 ), von Wachter, Song & Manchester (2009 use administrative data; Ruhm (1991) and Stevens (1997) use the PSID; and Carrington (1993 ), Farber (1997 , Neal (1995) , Topel (1990) use the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS).
11 Displaced workers are a subset of all unemployed workers. The formal definition says that displaced workers are fairly attached to their job and are involuntarily separated from it, with little chance of being recalled by their employer or finding a similar job within a reasonable span of time. To select workers who are attached to their job, the job displacement literature usually focuses on workers with a minimum tenure on a job. The job loss must also be involuntary, so quits, temporary layoffs and firings for cause are not job displacements.
12 See also den Haan, Haefke & Ramey (2005) , and Sargent (2007) and (2008) .
consistent with those estimates. Thus, the amount of wage dispersion is dictated by the data, and is not imposed in the model. In Coles & Masters (2000) workers also lose human capital when unemployed. However, they also introduce training, so workers can recover some of the lost human capital when they start a job. In equilibrium, firms train workers until they regain all of their lost human capital. However, the empirical evidence shows important wage losses after becoming unemployed.
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The paper starts with the model, and continues with the empirical work using the PSID.
Next, using numerical methods, I derive the solution for the case of constant benefits during unemployment, which to my knowledge is not a widely used approach in papers using the simplifying assumption of proportional benefits. 14 I show that both models generate very similar amounts of wage dispersion. I then assess the amount of wage dispersion consistent with the CPS. Finally, I incorporate on-the-job search in the model with unemployment history.
The Labor Market
The model builds on the random matching model of Pissarides (1985) . I introduce the assumption that workers gradually lose human capital during unemployment at a constant rate δ. The loss depends on the time the worker spends in unemployment. Throughout the paper the term unemployment history refers to the cumulative duration of unemployment spells. I use γ to denote unemployment history.
Given the focus on residual wage dispersion, human capital in the model is net of other controls such as education. Thus, human capital depends only on unemployment history. I denote workers' human capital by h(γ). Normalizing h(0) = 1, the constant depreciation rate during unemployment implies human capital is given by h(γ) = e −δγ . Workers do not accumulate human capital when they are employed.
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Workers search for jobs, and firms for job applicants. I assume that the worker and the firm draw a productivity parameter p from a known distribution F (p) when they meet. The productivity of the match is determined by the product of match-specific productivity p and the worker's human capital h(γ), i.e. by h(γ)p.
Following the approach in Pissarides (2000) , labor market flows are determined by a match- 13 Jacobson, LaLonde & Sullivan (2005) find that displaced workers regain some lost earnings if they receive training, but they remain far from recovering all lost earnings.
14 Coles & Masters (2000) do consider constant benefits during unemployment, but their solution is simplified by the retraining assumption.
15 Although there are some implicit returns to work experience. If an unemployed worker were employed she would be accumulating human capital. The parameter δ captures both this foregone human capital accumulation and the loss of human capital from being unemployed. The model is isomorphic to a model in which workers accumulate human capital during employment and lose it during unemployment, because what matters for workers' search decision is that the human capital gap widens between employment and unemployment.
ing function m(V, U ), where V denotes vacancies and U unemployed workers. Market tightness θ is defined as the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers, θ = V /U . I assume the usual conditions for the matching function, that it is increasing in both its arguments and concave, and that it displays constant returns. Workers find jobs at a rate f (θ) = m(V, U )/U , and firms receive applicants at a rate q(θ) = m(V, U )/V . The properties of the matching function imply that f (θ) = θq(θ). If the labor market is tight (θ high, many vacancies for a given number of unemployed workers) workers find jobs more easily, and firms have more difficulty finding applicants. In other words, ∂f /∂θ ≥ 0, and ∂q/∂θ ≤ 0. Separations occur at an exogenous rate s. The paper only considers the steady-state, so for simplicity I drop θ from the notation.
Workers are identical when they first join the labor market. However, they find and lose jobs, so in equilibrium they have different unemployment histories. I assume that workers leave the labor force at a rate µ, and are replaced by new workers with zero unemployment history.
This allows for a stationary distribution of unemployment histories. I denote the distribution of unemployment histories among unemployed workers by G U (γ), and among employed workers
by G E (γ). These distributions are endogenous.
I assume that unemployed workers receive payments bh(γ). With this assumption, payments during unemployment are proportional to workers' human capital level h(γ), and decrease at the rate δ while they remain unemployed. This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis, and allows for a closed-form solution. In section 4, I solve the model with constant b numerically, and assess how this assumption changes the results.
Asset equations for workers and firms
Unemployed workers accept a job if the match-specific productivity is above their reservation productivity. Given that human capital decreases while the worker stays unemployed, the reservation productivity may depend on unemployment history γ. In section 2.2 I show that Nash Bargaining implies that the reservation productivity is the same for workers and firms.
To avoid unnecessary complications in notation, I denote this reservation productivity by p * γ . Let U (γ) be the value function of an unemployed worker with unemployment history γ, and W (γ, p) the value function of an employed worker in a job with match-specific productivity p.
If r is the interest rate, the asset equation for the unemployed worker is
The left-hand side of (1) represents the returns to being unemployed with unemployment history γ, taking into account that workers leave the labor force at rate µ (so r + µ is the effective discount rate). Consider now the right-hand side. The first term corresponds to the payments workers receive while unemployed. The second term captures the option value of being unemployed, namely that at rate f the worker receives a job offer with expected gain
The last term captures the capital depreciation of the value of unemployment U (γ), caused by the depreciation of human capital while the worker stays unemployed.
Wages depend on the human capital of the worker and the match-specific productivity. I use w(γ, p) to denote the wage of a worker with unemployment history γ, and employed in a job with match-specific productivity p. The asset equation for the employed worker is
The intuition behind this equation is similar. The worker receives a wage w(γ, p), and at a rate s the worker loses the job, which carries a net loss of size W (γ, p) − U (γ).
To find successful candidates, firms post vacancies at cost k. Remember that later I prove that the reservation productivity p * γ is the same for firms and workers. So the firm hires a worker with unemployment history γ if p ≥ p * γ . The firm receives applications from unemployed workers with γ given by the endogenous distribution G U (γ). The asset equation for vacancies
I assume free entry in the market for vacancies, meaning that firms post vacancies until V = 0.
When production begins, a worker produces h(γ)p. Having to pay wages, the firm receives h(γ)p − w(γ, p). The asset equation for a filled job position is
The intuition is similar. The left-hand side represents the returns to a filled position. The right-hand side captures that the filled position produces a flow h(γ)p − w(γ, p), and that at rate s the job is destroyed, with a net loss of J − V .
Reservation productivity and wages
In the next few paragraphs I find two results about reservation productivities. First, given the assumption that unemployment benefits and the productivity of matches are proportional to human capital, I prove that the reservation productivity p * γ is independent of γ. This simplifies greatly the analysis. Second, I find an expression that links wages and the reservation productivity.
I assume that wages are determined by Nash Bargaining. When the worker and the firm meet, if p ≥ p * γ production begins and they split the surplus. Given a bargaining strength β, the wage is the solution to
The surplus of the match is given by J(γ, p) − V + W (γ, p) − U (γ). Nash Bargaining implies that the worker gets a share β of the surplus, and the firm a share 1 − β. Combining (5) and the asset equations for the worker and the firm (2) and (4) gives the following result:
Two properties about p * γ are useful. Consider a firm and a worker that meet and draw a productivity parameter p. Accepting the offer has a value W (γ, p) to the worker. If he rejects the offer the worker walks away with U (γ). It follows that p * γ satisfies
Similarly, if production starts the match has a value J(γ, p) to the firm. If the firm does not hire the worker it gets the value of the vacancy V = 0. Thus, the reservation productivity p * γ satisfies
The asset equations (2) and (4), and the sharing rule (6) give the first expression for w(γ, p):
Evaluating the asset equations for the employed worker and the filled job position (2) and (4) at p = p * γ , and using (7) and (8) gives
Combining these two properties gives
Finally, (9) and (12) give the first expression linking wages w(γ, p) and p * γ :
The following result simplifies the model.
The proof is included in appendix A. The assumption of proportional benefits bh(γ) is crucial for this result. Intuitively, in the wage bargaining process the worker expects to be compensated for giving up U (γ). While the value of output h(γ)p decreases with unemployment, the value of benefits bh(γ) does too. The first process raises the reservation productivity, as better matches are required if h(γ) is low, and the second lowers it. Given that all quantities are proportional to h(γ) these two opposing effects cancel out, and the reservation productivity stays constant. I formally prove this by guessing a solution and proving that the guess is correct. By contrast, as I show in section 4, when benefits are constant this result disappears.
With constant benefits b, the worker expects to be compensated for giving up b, but the value of expected output h(γ)p decreases with unemployment. Workers and firms then require better matches for longer unemployment histories. Proposition 1 gives the following wage expression
Next, I derive the M m ratio to assess the amount of wage dispersion generated by the model.
The M m ratio
As work by Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) shows, in most search models one can derive the M m ratio without assuming any distribution for match-specific productivities F (p). This property represents a major advantage over other measures of wage dispersion, such as the variance. I show that the M m ratio in the model displays the same property, and is independent of the distributional assumption for F (p).
w is the average wage, which is given bȳ
Taking expectations of wage expression (14), I find thatw =h(γ)(βp + (1 − β)p * ), wherē
This implies that
Equation (14) shows that wages are proportional to the human capital level h(γ). Taking the logarithm of (14), and using that log(h(γ)) = −δγ, shows that log wages are linear in unemployment history γ, with a coefficient δ. Therefore, h(γ) can be removed from wages by controlling for unemployment history in a Mincerian wage regression -this is done in the next section, which contains the empirical part of the paper. Given the focus of the paper on residual wage dispersion, I focus on the dispersion in βp + (1 − β)p * . Therefore, the M m ratio is given by
To derive the M m ratio, use asset equation (4), and wage expression (14) to find
Substituting equation (19), the Nash Bargaining sharing rule (6), and (12) into the equation for U (γ) given by (1) implies the following expression
The above equation allows for a simple expression of the M m ratio
where
is the job finding probability. 17 Appendix A shows how to derive the M m ratio from (20) in more detail.
Expression (21) shows that the M m ratio measures wage dispersion without relying on any distributional assumption for F (p). While it depends on the job finding rate
, this rate is eventually determined by the data, and no functional assumption for F (p)
is required. Further, substituting δ = 0 yields the same M m ratio as in the Pissarides (1985) model.
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The relationship between the job finding and separation rates and the M m ratio is intuitive. With higher f * , workers find jobs more quickly, and the value of workers' outside option increases. Workers respond to the higher outside option by increasing their reservation productivities, which lowers wage dispersion and the M m ratio. The M m ratio is thus decreasing in f * . The separation rate has the opposite effect, so higher separation rates increase the M m ratio. Finally, a higher δ makes unemployment more costly for workers. Workers are willing to lower their reservation productivity to leave unemployment more rapidly, which increases the M m ratio.
By using the M m ratio, one only requires knowledge of r, ρ, s, f * , µ and δ to assess the amount of wage dispersion in the model. Reliable estimates for these parameters can be found from data. In the next section, I use micro data to estimate them and quantify the size of wage dispersion in the model.
Empirical work
I use data from the 1968-1997 waves of the PSID.
19 Appendix B describes the sample selection.
The main motivation for using the PSID is that it follows workers over time. In the model wages depend on workers' unemployment history. Given the panel structure of the PSID, I construct workers' unemployment history to estimate δ. The panel structure has the further advantage of allowing for fixed effects estimation. There may be some unobserved characteristics that make some workers more productive than others. If less productive workers are more likely to be unemployed, the estimation may be biased. By controlling for workers' constant unobserved characteristics, fixed effects estimation solves this problem. Finally, one concern may be that when a worker joins the sample, previous unemployment history is unknown. Fixed-effects 17 While job offers arrive at rate f , the worker accepts them if p ≥ p * , which happens with probability 1 − F (p * ). Therefore, the job finding rate is given by
, which is the expression Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) find for baseline search models. Further, if δ = 0 one can see that the model corresponds to the Pissarides (1985) model. 19 The PSID collected data biennially after 1997 for funding reasons. Therefore, after 1997 information on the number of weeks in unemployment is unavailable for the years without interviews. See Appendix B for more details.
again solves this problem. When a worker joins the sample, prior unemployment history remains constant in later observations, so worker fixed effects controls for it. This is another reason for preferring fixed-effects regression over cross-sectional.
Estimating δ
In the model, δ captures the percentage wage loss caused by unemployment history, which consists of the accumulated unemployment spells of the worker. The PSID asks workers how many weeks they were unemployed in the previous year.
20 I use the answers to this question to construct unemployment history. I include this information into the variable U nhis, which contains unemployment history in months. To estimate δ, I regress the log of wages on U nhis and other covariates X:
In the regression above, δ gives the percentage wage loss for an additional month of unemployment history. Taking the logarithm of the equation for wages in (14) shows that log wages are linear in unemployment history γ, with a coefficient δ. Therefore, wage equation (14) is the theoretical equivalent to equation (22). As the estimated δ captures the exact same effect on wages that δ has in the model, this empirical strategy provides an estimate that can be consistently entered in the model.
The results are included in Table 1 . Column (1) of Table 1 corresponds to the regression with worker fixed-effects. Fixed effects regression controls for all constant characteristics, so in column (1) X also includes potential experience (quadratic), regional dummies, and one-digit occupational dummies. 21 The regression gives an estimate for δ of −.0123. I use this value in the rest of the paper.
To check the robustness of the estimate for δ, I employ a variety of alternative specifications for the regression in (22). The results, shown in Table 1 , are very robust. Column (2) gives δ in the cross-sectional regression, without fixed-effects. Not having fixed-effects, I add several timeinvariant regressors to X. Covariates X in column (2) include the covariates in column (1), plus race dummies, educational dummies, year-dummies, and an interaction between occupation and year-dummies. Column (3) corresponds to the same regression as in column (1) workers. The probabilities P EE (t) and P U E (t) of transitions EE and U E when the time between interviews is t, taking into account that workers can find and lose jobs between employment status observations, are
I apply Maximum Likelihood Estimation to the above expressions. The estimation gives the Poisson rates for the separation and job finding rates s and f * .
the updated data in a supplement. However, while having some advantages, using this supplement also has some disadvantages. Some people could not be recontacted, so one needs to drop some individuals to use this supplement. If recontact was possible, the PSID asks about events that happened many years before. In any case, as the text points out, one or two digit regressions give very similar results for δ over the period for which both are available, so this is not an issue. 23 See Ross (2007) for an exposition of this type of processes.
Comparing the empirical M m ratio to the model's prediction
To estimate the empirical M m ratio, I use the 50-10 percentile ratio of the residual of logwages in a Mincerian wage regression. Although the M m ratio is the ratio of the average and the minimum wage, using the 10th percentile reduces the measurement error associated with the minimum observation. I consider the residual of wage regression (22), with fixed effects.
Given that the dependent variable is log-wages, one must take the exponential of the residual before extracting the 50th and 10th percentiles. The resulting 50-10 percentile ratio has a value of 1.31. 24 If one considers the residual of regression (22), but without controlling for unemployment history, the 50-10 percentile ratio has a value of 1.33.
I compare the empirical M m ratio with the one in the model by using expression (21). The M m ratio is uniquely determined by r, ρ, s, f * , µ and δ. The earlier estimations give δ, f * , and s. Table 2 presents these values, where the flow rates correspond to monthly rates, and the value for δ to the effect of one month of unemployment history on wages. The value for µ is consistent with a working life of 40 years on average. I choose the interest rate r to be 5% on average, which implies a monthly value r ≈ 0.0041. Finally, I consider the same assumption as in Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) , and use the value in for ρ of 0.4.
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With these values, the model generates an M m ratio of 1.14.
To provide further evidence of the model's contribution, I compare its M m ratio to the one corresponding to δ = 0. With δ = 0, the model corresponds to the Pissarides (1985) model, which delivers an M m ratio of 1.03. The baseline search model struggles to generate significant wage dispersion, precisely the point made by Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) .
While the mechanism of the paper accounts only for some of the wage dispersion observed in the data, comparing the above values for the M m ratio shows that the improvement brought by the model is important.
Correcting for selection bias
Attrition in panels may lead to selection bias problems. Individuals drop from the sample, and the reason may not be random. What determines whether we observe an individual may be correlated with wages. To control for selection bias, I use a version of Heckman (1979) 24 Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2007) follow a similar approach. They find an M m ratio of 1.32 for the PSID, after controlling for fixed effects.
25 Some papers use higher values for ρ. Hall & Milgrom (2008) choose ρ = 0.71 and Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) ρ ≈ 0.955. As Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) point out, with higher replacement ratios search models match the volatility of unemployment, but generate less wage dispersion, making the frictional wage dispersion problem worse. The highest value used by Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) also implies that labor supply becomes very responsive to unemployment benefits, as work by Costain & Reiter (2008) shows, which is at odds with data. Hall & Milgrom (2008) make a similar point, with the value from Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) Frisch elasticities are too large. In section 6 of the paper I discuss higher replacement ratios in more detail.
two-steps procedure to correct for selection bias. It consists of using some information that affects the probability of leaving the sample without directly affecting wages. I use the number of children under 18 and marital status as a determinant of whether the individual stays in the sample or not. Intuitively, married workers with young children are less likely to move and leave the sample than non-married workers without children. I exploit the hypothesis that these variables affect the probability of sample selection, but are not directly correlated with wages, to produce Heckman's two-step correction term. More specifically, I run the following probit regression
where s * i is the latent variable, such that s * i > 0 if the worker is present in the sample. Regressors Z i contain the variables in X, plus number of children under 18, marital status and number of periods present in the sample. The number of children and marital status are highly significant in the first stage. The Likelihood-Ratio test is included in Table 1 . The probit estimation produces the Heckman correction termλ, that is then added as a covariate in (22). Column (5) in Table 1 displays the results. In column (5) X contains the covariates of regression column (2), plus the correction term. The estimates of δ in columns (2) and (5) are very close, so selection bias does not appear to affect the estimate for δ.
Labor market with constant b during unemployment
In the previous sections I assumed that unemployed workers receive benefits proportional to their human capital, i.e. they receive bh(γ). From this assumption, reservation productivities become independent of unemployment history, thus simplifying the model and allowing for a closed form solution. To understand how this assumption may affect the results, consider the following relationship between benefits and workers' reservation choice. If unemployment benefits are higher, workers' outside option increases in value. Workers respond to this by increasing their reservation productivity. This relation between benefits and workers' reservation choice may suggest that by assuming decreasing benefits workers become less picky, thus potentially driving the results. To address this concern, I develop the model of the previous section, but now with constant unemployment benefits b. I analyze how this new assumption affects the M m ratio in the model.
Search behavior and labor market outcomes
Reservation productivities depend on unemployment history γ, so I can not simplify the notation p * γ . Equations (1) to (13) remain the same, except that bh(γ) should be replaced by b. I reproduce here expression (13) for wages, which is the result of combining the asset equation of an employed worker (2), the asset equation of a filled vacancy (4), and the surplus sharing rule (6):
The next proposition characterizes workers' search behavior, and provides some important results about reservation productivities p * γ . The following results are independent of any distributional assumption for F (p).
Proposition 2. a. There existsγ such that p * γ = p max , and the reservation wage of workers with γ =γ is given by w(γ, p *
b. The reservation productivity p * γ is increasing in γ. c. The reservation wage w(γ, p * γ ) is decreasing in γ.
Corollary. The job finding probability
The proofs are included in appendix A, but I provide some intuition here. When bargaining over wages, both workers and firms receive their outside option plus a share of the surplus of the match. The worker's outside option U (γ) includes the constant benefits b, so the worker must always get payments b at the very least. While benefits are constant, the potential output h(γ)p decreases with unemployment history. Eventually, if the worker stays unemployed for too long, no matches yield p high enough to cover b. At that point no matches are profitable, and the worker drops from the labor force. The proposition shows in result (a) that if unemployment history goes beyondγ, workers leave the labor force.
26 A similar mechanism explains result (b) that p * γ is increasing in γ. Benefits b are constant, but output h(γ)p and the surplus of the match decrease with higher unemployment history γ. The higher γ gets, the better matches are required for the match to be profitable. In the model of previous sections, assuming decreasing benefits bh(γ) pushed down the reservation productivities by lowering the worker's outside option U (γ).
27 Finally, the result of the corollary, that the job finding probability is decreasing with γ, follows from the increasing reservation productivity.
26 Coles & Masters (2000) also find that if benefits are constant, and skills depreciate during unemployment, workers leave the labor force if they stay unemployed too long, becoming long-term unemployed. 27 The additional assumption that benefits are proportional to h(γ) gives the constant reservation productivity in section 2.
Reservation productivities
Because the reservation productivity p * γ depends on γ if benefits are constant, a closed form expression is not straightforward. Further, one needs to assume a distribution for match-specific productivities F (p) to be able to solve the model. To simplify the calculations I assume that 
I derive an equation similar to (19). Substituting wage expression (26) into the asset equation
Given the above equation and the Nash Bargaining sharing rule (6), the expression for U (γ)
as given in (27) becomes:
Equation (29) provides a way of solving for p * γ numerically. Using numerical integration and iteration methods I find p * γ for a grid {γ 1 = 0, γ 2 , ..., γ n =γ} of the possible unemployment histories [0,γ] . Appendix A presents the details of the computational strategy.
Endogenous distributions
With constant benefits, deriving the M m ratio requires knowledge of the endogenous distributions of unemployment histories. I use G U (γ) and G E (γ) to denote their cumulative density functions for unemployed and employed workers, and N and E for the number of unemployed and employed workers.
To find the endogenous distribution of γ, I look at the flows in the labor market. Unemployed workers find jobs at a rate f (1 − F (p * γ )), employed workers lose their jobs at rate s, and all workers leave the labor force at rate µ. Workers leaving the labor force are replaced by new 28 The parameter p max plays no role in the results, because independently of its value p * γ and p max keep the same ratio. Its value would matter if one introduces endogenous and exogenous separations, and is interested in matching their empirical values, as in Pissarides (2009). entrants with zero unemployment history.
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First, consider the group of unemployed workers with unemployment history lower than γ.
In steady-state, a stationary distribution requires that the flows in and out of this group be equal. For γ ≤γ, this condition gives the following flow equation
The left-hand side corresponds to flows out of the group of unemployed workers with unemployment history lower than γ. The first term represents the workers in that group who have exactly γ unemployment history; the second term those who find a job; and the third term those who leave the labor force. The right-hand side of (30) captures the flows in. The first term are the employed workers with unemployment history lower than γ who lose their jobs, and the last term are the new entrants (they have zero unemployment history).
Similarly, consider now the group of employed workers with unemployment history lower than γ. In steady-state, for γ ≤γ, the following flow equation holds
The intuition is similar. The left-hand side of (31) captures the flows out of the group of employed workers with unemployment history lower than γ, and the right-hand side are the flows in.
When γ >γ, only workers with unemployment history lower thanγ find jobs. Similar equations to (30) and (31) hold for γ >γ:
and
The results would be the same if workers are replaced afterγ by new workers with zero unemployment history.
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To simplify the exposition, I define Φ(γ) as
The flow equations shown above give a solution for the density g U (γ). For γ ≤γ
and for γ >γ
The derivations are included in appendix A. To find the final expression for the densities, I
derive g U (γ) by using the following identities:
The above equations result from integrating (35) between 0 andγ, and (36) betweenγ and infinity.
Given that g U (γ) is known now, I derive G E (γ) by using (31) and (33):
The density g E (γ) follows by taking derivative:
Calibration
Before evaluating wage dispersion in the model I need to calibrate b and f . I choose two targets. In line with the choice for the replacement ratio ρ in the previous sections, the first target imposes that ρ be around .40, so benefits b must be around 40% of average wagesw.
Average wages are given bȳ
Given this expression for average wages, the target requires b/w = 0.4.
The second target imposes that the job finding probability in the model must match its empirical counterpart. Thus, I choose the value for f for which the average job finding rate Figure 1 depicts the reservation productivities p * γ as a function of unemployment history γ over its support [0,γ] . As proven in proposition 2, the reservation productivity is increasing in γ, and when γ =γ it reaches the maximum value p max . Figure 2 shows the probability density function g E (γ) as a function of γ, also over its support [0,γ] .
The M m ratio with constant benefits
Similar to the model with proportional benefits, wages are proportional to the human capital level h(γ), with w(γ, p) = h(γ)(βp + (1 − β)p * γ ). The focus of the paper is on residual wage dispersion, and given that one can remove h(γ) in wage regressions, I focus on the wage dispersion generated by βp + (1 − β)p * γ . Using that the lowest reservation productivity corresponds to γ = 0, the M m ratio is given by
For the model with constant benefits, the M m ratio has a value of around 1.14. Table 4 summarizes the several results found for the M m ratio.
Although unemployment punishes workers less when benefits are constant, the M m ratio is higher than that of the model with proportional benefits. To understand why, consider workers with unemployment history below and above average. Workers with below average unemployment history are less picky, and have lower reservation productivity, whereas the opposite is true for workers with above average unemployment history. Given that the model tries to match a replacement ratio of 40%, to match this target workers with below average unemployment history become less picky than workers in the model with proportional benefits.
Because the M m ratio relies on the lowest reservation productivity, this mechanism increases the M m ratio. However, the resulting increase is mild, because workers with below average unemployment history behave in a very similar way than workers in the model with proportional benefits. Given that the distribution of workers is very concentrated on workers with low unemployment history, who have very similar reservation productivities compared to the proportional benefits model, this barely affects the average productivity. In particular, if b is chosen to match the replacement ratio in the model with proportional benefits, the same b almost matches the replacement ratio when benefits are constant, because a large mass of workers (those with low unemployment history) have almost the same reservation productivity.
5 Extending the exercise to the economy at large what matters for wage dispersion is the relative size of f * and s. 31 As discussed earlier, while both f * and s are higher in the CPS, the ratio f * /s is higher in the PSID. 32 Thus the increase in the M m ratio.
With CPS labor flows, the M m ratio is around 1.05 for the baseline random matching model, which corresponds to the model with δ = 0. Using the same labor market flows, I find that the model with loss of human capital during unemployment gives an M m ratio of up to 31 Or the average job finding rate f e in the case of constant benefits. 32 That a labor outcome depends on the ratio of f * and s is not surprising, for example in search models the unemployment rate also depends on the ratio rather than the separate values. dispersion remains unexplained, but the model explains between 24% and 31% of the observed residual wage dispersion in the CPS. This an important improvement over the baseline model, as the baseline model can only explain 6% of observed wage dispersion.
Adding on-the-job search
In baseline search models, workers hold their jobs until separation occurs, so workers must go through unemployment to change jobs. Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) show that adding on-the-job search increases wage dispersion among identical workers. Intuitively, if workers can search for jobs when they are employed, they still hold the option to search when they accept a job offer. Therefore, unemployed workers are willing to accept lower wages. A lower reservation value increases wage dispersion among identical workers. The size of the increase depends on how frequently employed workers receive job offers relative to unemployed workers. Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) find wage dispersion for a search model with on-the-job search using a value for the arrival rate of offers on the job that is consistent with empirical job-to-job transitions. The magnitude of the M m ratio is similar to the one of the model with loss of human capital during unemployment, between 1.16 and 1.27. In the next section I combine both features in a search model.
The labor market
I assume that workers now also search on the job in the model with unemployment history and proportional benefits bh(γ) of section 2. Unemployed workers receive job offers at rate f u , and employed workers receive job offers at rate f w . The asset equations for unemployed workers
(1) and vacancies (3) remain the same. The equation for employed workers is now given by
The left-hand side of (43) represents the returns to holding a job. The right-hand side captures the flows from holding a job when workers search on-the-job. Workers receive wages w(γ, p). At a rate f w they now receive a job offer, and if the productivity is above the current level p they change jobs. Finally, workers lose the job at a rate s, which carries a net loss W (γ, p) − U (γ).
Similarly, the asset equation for a filled vacancy is now given by
Intuitively, firms get a net flow h(γ)p − w(γ, p). The job is destroyed either because of separation, which happens with frequency s, or because the worker finds a better job, which happens with frequency f w (1 − F (p)).
As in section 2, reservation productivities are independent of unemployment history γ. This simplifies the model and allows for a closed form expression of wage dispersion.
Proposition 3. The reservation productivity p * γ is independent of γ, i.e. p * γ = p * .
The proof proceeds in the same way as in the proof of proposition 1. 33 The intuition is similar. All payments, both during employment and unemployment, are proportional to the human capital level h(γ). As a result, unemployment history γ is irrelevant for workers' reservation decision.
Some of the results are the same as in the model of section 2. In particular, the reservation productivity satisfies (11) and Nash bargaining rule implies (6). In the next section I derive a closed form solution for the M m ratio in the model.
The M m ratio
Using the asset equations one gets that wages are of the form w(γ, p) = h(γ)ŵ(p), wherê w(p) is independent of γ. This shows that, as in the model with human capital losses during unemployment, log wages are linear in unemployment history with coefficient δ. Given the focus of the paper on wage dispersion among identical workers, I control for unemployment history in the empirical exercise and focus on the wage dispersion ofŵ(p).
For a given F (p), workers move jobs once they become employed. I denote G(p) the endogenous distribution of match productivities. The average ofŵ(p), which I denotew = E(ŵ(p)|p > p * ), is thus given bȳ
Equation (11) gives that w(γ, p * ) = h(γ)p * , so the M m ratio is given by
Using the asset equation for unemployed workers (1) and the asset equation for employed workers (43) evaluated at p = p * gives the following equation
Combining this equation with the other equations in the model gives the following expression for the M m ratio
where f u is the job finding probability and f w is the rate at which job offers arrive on the job. 34 Appendix A includes the details of the derivation.
By shutting down the appropriate channel, expression (48) also provides the M m ratio for the baseline search model, the model with human capital losses during unemployment and the on-the-job search model. If δ = 0, the unemployment history mechanism is shut down and (48) gives the expression for the M m ratio in the on-the-job search model. 
Quantifying the model's M m ratio
Wage dispersion, as measured by the M m ratio in (48), depends uniquely on a few parameters, r, ρ, s, µ, f u , f w and δ. Further, it is independent of any distributional assumption about F (p). The relationship between these parameters and wage dispersion is the same as before, only that now it further depends on the arrival rate of offers on the job f w . Large values of f w imply that it is easier to switch jobs, making the option value of searching on the job larger.
Workers thus accept lower wages and wage dispersion increases.
I use the CPS values for f u and s. To quantify wage dispersion in the model, the expression for the M m ratio requires a value for the arrival rate f w . Similar to Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) I choose the value that is consistent with empirical job-to-job transitions.
Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Nagypal (2008) 34 Given the paper's focus on the steady state, without loss of generality I assume that F (p * ) = 0 for the derivation of the M m ratio. Therefore f u is the job finding rate. This assumption makes the exposition simpler, but the results are exactly the same without it.
35 That is, M m = (1 +
finds monthly job-to-job flows of around 2.2%. This implies a value for f w of around 0.07.
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The other parameters are chosen in the same way as in section 5. The model generates an M m ratio of around 2.04, and thus accounts for all of the observed residual wage dispersion.
6.4 Frictional wage dispersion and the unemployment volatility puzzle Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) show that in search models frictional wage dispersion and unemployment volatility are closely related. 37 The baseline search model usually requires high values of the replacement ratio to match the volatility of unemployment. However, high values of the replacement ratio make the frictional wage dispersion problem worse in baseline search models. Intuitively, if benefits are higher relative to average wages the value of workers' outside option increases. Workers wait longer to accept a job offer and wage dispersion decreases.
Therefore, in search models there is a trade-off between trying to match the unemployment volatility or generate significant wage dispersion.
I calculate the M m ratio in the model with both on-the-job search and unemployment history for the different values of the replacement ratio ρ used in the literature. Shimer (2005) uses a value of 0.40, which is the value Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) and the previous sections use. Hall & Milgrom (2008) choose ρ = 0.71 based on data on the elasticity of labor supply. Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) calibrate vacancy costs to get the highest value in the literature, around 0.95.
38 Table 6 gives the M m ratio for the three values of the replacement ratio. The M m ratio is 2.04 with a replacement ratio of 0.40, 1.81 if the replacement ratio is 0.71, and 1.67 for the highest replacement ratio of 0.95. Therefore, even for the highest value of the replacement ratio the amount of wage dispersion is very large. Although some wage dispersion remains unexplained for higher values of the replacement ratio, the model with both on-the-job search and unemployment history accounts for almost all of the observed residual wage dispersion.
Concluding Remarks
Motivated by the findings of Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) that baseline search models fail to generate significant wage dispersion, this paper investigates how much wage dispersion arises if workers lose some skills during unemployment. I develop a search model in which workers gradually lose some human capital while they stay unemployed. The wage losses caused by unemployment matter for workers' search behavior. Knowing that unemployment hurts their earnings, workers lower their reservation productivity and accept lower wages to leave unemployment more quickly. The paper shows that the model generates significant wage dispersion among identical workers and is an important improvement over baseline search models.
Using the measure proposed by Hornstein, Krusell & Violante (2011) , the M m ratio, I find a closed form expression for wage dispersion that depends only on a few parameters. Combining the theoretical predictions of the model and estimates from micro data, the model explains between 44% and 47% of the observed residual wage dispersion in the PSID, and between 24%
and 31% of that in the CPS. By contrast, the baseline model accounts for around 10% for the PSID, and 6% for the CPS. When workers can also search on-the-job the model accounts for most of the observed residual wage dispersion. Even for large values of the replacement ratio the search framework with both unemployment history and on-the-job search generates large amounts of wage dispersion. The paper thus addresses the trade-off in search models between matching frictional wage dispersion and the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies.
In recessions jobs become scarce, unemployment rises, and workers take longer to find jobs.
The results of this paper suggest that, by accounting for workers' human capital depreciation during unemployment, the welfare losses in recessions may be larger than previously thought.
Because more workers are unemployed, and unemployment durations are longer, the amount of human capital destroyed during recessions may be large. In the context of the recent crisis, the consequences for workers' labor market prospects have been dramatic, suggesting that one should take these costs into account.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1
The proof proceeds by guessing a solution and then confirming the guess. Guessing that U (γ) = h(γ)U , with U independent of γ. Given the guess, I use now that (r + µ)
which is independent of γ. In the text I use p * to denote the reservation productivity. Substituting these results in (1), the asset equation for U (γ), gives a unique solution for U . Given that the Bellman equation has a unique solution (it is a contraction), this proves the result. expression forγ.
Proof of b. The proof requires a few steps. First, define the total surplus of a match as
The Nash Bargaining sharing rule implies that workers and firms get their outside option plus their share of the total surplus (β for the worker, 1 − β for the firm). As potential output is decreasing in γ, it is clear that the surplus is decreasing in γ. To prove this more formally, using the asset equations one finds that S(γ, p) = h(γ)p−(r+µ)U (γ). When p = p * γ the surplus equals zero for all γ, so dS(γ, p)/dγ = 0 for all γ. Taking derivative of S(γ, p) with respect to γ one sees that it is decreasing in p. This implies that dS(γ, p)/dγ < 0 if p > p * γ . Note that all these expressions are well-defined. Given that J(γ, p) = (1 − β)S(γ, p), then J(γ, p) is also decreasing in γ if p > p * γ . Now assume that there exist γ 0 and γ 1 such that γ 0 < γ 1 and p * γ 0
. This assumption
But J is decreasing in γ, and given the assumption p * γ 0
) is well defined and
This is a contradiction, thus p * γ is non-decreasing in γ. That p * γ is not constant can be readily seen from the expression for U (γ). 
This proves that U (γ) is decreasing. Since (r + µ)U (γ) = w(γ, p * γ ), this proves part (c) of the proposition.
To prove that Π(γ) is decreasing, first observe that Π(γ) = 0, and Π(γ) > 0 if γ <γ. This implies that Π(γ) must be decreasing nearγ. Therefore, if it is not true that Π (γ) < 0 for all γ, there must exists γ 0 such that Π (γ 0 ) = 0. I show that this leads to a contradiction.
Take derivative of Π(γ):
That Π (γ 0 ) = 0 implies that
which further implies that
That π(γ) is decreasing implies that π(γ 0 ) ≥ π(γ) for all γ ≥ γ 0 . Therefore
The expression above implies that Π(γ 0 ) < π(γ 0 ) r , leading to a contradiction.
Endogenous distributions G U (γ) and G E (γ) with constant benefits b
Equation (31) implies
Similarly, using (33) and that G E (γ) = 1 as no worker is hired if γ >γ
Now take the derivative of (30) with respect to γ to find
Taking now derivative of (31)
Combining the two equations above gives
which implies the following differential equation
where Φ(γ) is defined in the text as Φ(γ) = µ
. The solution gives the expression in the text:
To find g U (γ) for γ >γ I proceed similarly. Taking derivative of (32)
This implies the result of the text:
Numerical strategy to find p * γ Consider equation (29). Using the assumption of This error decreases as the grid uses more nodes. However, as the strategy combines numerical integration and iteration methods, the final bound on the error is not straightforward. To assess the error involved in this numerical strategy, I test how well it approximates a known solution.
This provides, in the language of Judd (1998) , some backward error analysis. Consider the general case of the equation above
The method described earlier provides a solution for this general case. For the case where the a i are constant and φ(Γ, f (Γ)) = f (Γ) an exact solution exists. Comparing the exact solution to the one provided by the numerical strategy shows that the numerical solution can get as close as necessary to the exact solution within a reasonable time.
To find the average wagew I now derive the endogenous distribution G(p). Given the paper's focus on the steady state, without loss of generality I assume that F (p * ) = 0. The results are exactly the same without this assumption, but the derivation is simpler. 39 The interpretation is that f u becomes the job finding rate. Consider the group of employed workers in a job with productivity lower than p. In steady state the following flow equation holds
(1 − u)G(p)(s + f w (1 − F (p))) = f u F (p)u.
The left-hand side of the above equation are the flows out of the group, and consists of job separations and quits to better jobs with productivity still lower than p. The right-hand side are the flows in, which consist of unemployed workers who find a job with productivity lower than p. Similarly, in steady state
These equations imply that
B Appendix: PSID
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) started collecting data in 1968. The original PSID consisted of two samples: the core sample, representative of the US population; and the SEO sample, an oversample of low income families. In 1968 the PSID initially followed 5000 families, 3000 of them from the core sample, and the rest from the SEO sample. Since then the PSID has grown in size, as it followed young family members when they formed their own family.
The PSID collected data annually between 1968 and 1997, but biennially after 1997 for funding reasons. Therefore, after 1997 information on the number of weeks in unemployment is unavailable for the years without interviews. 40 For example, if the worker is interviewed in 1997 and again in 1999, information on number of weeks unemployed in 1998 is unavailable.
41 Although very few workers are affected by this once I implement the previous selection criteria. Notes.- Table 5 shows the M m ratio in the model when the job finding and separation rates are taken from PSID estimates. Baseline model refers to the model with δ equal 0, which corresponds to the Pissarides (1985) model. The bh(γ) and b models correspond to the models with proportional and constant benefits. The cell f * − 1std gives the M m ratio evaluated at the value of f * minus one standard deviation of the estimate for f * in the PSID. Similarly for the other cells. Notes.- Table 5 shows the M m ratio in the model when the job finding and separation rates are taken from . Baseline model refers to the model with δ equal 0, which corresponds to the Pissarides (1985) model. The bh(γ) and b models correspond to the models with proportional and constant benefits. 2.04 . 71 Hall & Milgrom (2008) 1.81 . 95 Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008) 1.67 
